The Three Seas Initiative as an opportunity and a challenge for small states

The Three Seas Initiative includes twelve EU member states, most of which are so-called small European states[i]. These include six states with a population of less than 10 million people with a territory of no more than 80,000 km2,[ii] and also four other states that slightly exceed either the population or area indicated above[iii]. In this context, Poland and Romania stand out in terms of potential, which is a source of asymmetry in the region’s multilateral relations, representing an important factor influencing the nature of the Three Seas Initiative. The participation of small states in this form of regional cooperation is a consequence of their efforts to strengthen their international position. According to the hypothesis, the main opportunities[iv] presented to them by the Three Seas Initiative pertain to affecting its activities so that they correspond to their preferences and allow for a stronger influence on the direction of the region’s economic development through the development of energy, transport and digital infrastructure. Indirectly, this cooperation provides small states with the opportunity to increase their impact on changes in the international environment in terms of politics and security. However, among the threats, the concerns of small states mainly revolve around a potential mismatch between the priorities of their foreign policies and actions taken within the Three Seas Initiative, which is not among their priorities. Instead, it is designed to achieve other objectives inherent in the interests of particular states. The small states’ perspective should be taken into account when building a communication strategy, which is a pillar of the international cooperation development. This strategy should take into account the high sensitivity of small states to signals of unclear intentions from strong actors, as well as concerns about dominance in a region where superpowers are still active alongside the so-called middle powers. The communication strategy by Poland, perceived as the leader of the Three Seas Initiative,[v] is not based on a coherent message. Given the strong polarization of the political scene, it facilitates external and internal forces in opposition to the Polish authorities to deepen mistrust and raise doubts about the forms of cooperation supported by Poland. Another complication is that Polish elites lack knowledge of the specific instruments used by small states in foreign policy, combined with the occasional treatment of small states from a position of strength.[vi]

The Three Seas Initiative is based on a model of cooperation specific to Central Europe with a certain degree of stability and recurrence, albeit with no permanent structures and administrative background. It lacks a status of an international organisation. It is a relatively permanent partnership, established through the international negotiations, functioning since 2016 on the basis of annual presidential summits where declarations are adopted. In the field of political sciences, we do not have a single accurate term for such types of cooperation, described by the very partners in their declarations as a ‘cooperation platform’.[vii] In a terminological manner, I recognise the Three Seas Initiative as an international institution in terms of political sciences, however, I emphasise that it is not an international institution in legal terms. By no means is it an international organisation. It is based on so-called summit diplomacy, complemented by the development of cooperation in other areas, including that of business, finance and the regions, e.g. the annual Business Forum and the Congress of Regions; the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund is emerging as a separate legal entity. This cooperation is believed to appeal to the participants through specific projects that provide tangible benefits.

On the methodological side, I rely on qualitative research. Scientific work on the small states and my previous research on the Three Seas Initiative serve as a starting point. Discussions during seminars at the ISP PAN as well as the results of the project called Research Centre for the Three Seas Initiative at the ISP PAN played an important role. Another valuable research experience was the study visit to Czechia in 2022 carried out within the framework of the said project. Among the literature I would like to highlight Piotr Bajda’s research paper entitled Małe państwo europejskie na arenie międzynarodowej Polityka zagraniczna Republiki Słowackiej w latach 1993–2016,[viii]8 Handbook on the Politics of Small States edited by Godfrey Baldacchino and Anders Wivel,[ix] European Strategic Autonomy and Small States’ Security In the Shadow of Power edited by Giedrius Česnakas i Justinas Juozaitis[x].

Theoretical framework

I refer to A. Wendt’s theory of social constructivism[xi] when analysing the concerns formulated by small states towards the Three Seas Initiative. Constructivism emphasises the role of narrative, information and message created in collective consciousness. The Three Seas Initiative, beyond Poland, remains unknown to the wider audience. A narrow but diverse image of this cooperation emerges, which raises uncertainty as to the genuine intentions of its participants and its goals and objectives. Uncertainty is amplified, firstly, by inconsistent message from the participants themselves, compounded by internal divisions, which is apparent in Poland as a result of polarisation, and secondly, by the involvement of third countries. For example, on the one hand the Three Seas Initiative is presented as an intra-EU forum for strengthening the European Union, while on the other hand the exact opposite narrative is being constructed, i.e. it is designed to be an alternative to the EU and to disintegrate it from within. The origin of the Three Seas Initiative is in some studies attributed to the shared experience of the countries undergoing transition after 1989, in others to the unfulfilled imperial aspirations of Poland, dating back to the Middle Ages and constituting their direct continuation. Another important element involves answering the question of what the Three Seas Initiative is in formal terms. On the one hand, the participants emphasise that it is an informal type of cooperation and is meant to remain so, but on the other hand, some believe that it is an international organisation. 

Attributing meanings to scientific terms that are completely different from the scientifically accepted terms creates terminological chaos, resulting either from ignorance, weakness of academic circles and intellectual elites, or from a deliberate effort to introduce chaos and/or deconstruct concepts. There are more similar examples of discrepancies in the narrative concerning the Three Seas Initiative. It has a negative impact on communication between participants and it makes it difficult to build trust. This is of particular importance as regards relations between representatives of small states and medium/large states like Poland. Such communication necessitates precision of message, cohesion and, at the same time, taking into account the concerns inherent in the policy of small states towards stronger actors in the international arena, subject to conditions at the international system level. The process of shaping message about the Three Seas Initiative is currently underway. Material factors play an important role, but they can be to some extent driven out of the information space. A. Wendt’s constructivism prioritises social structures over material ones, while emphasising the importance of objective constraints resulting from the international environment, which must be taken into account when interpreting international reality. It draws attention to the fact that if the structure of selection is very limiting, the explanation of actors’ behaviour actually depends on the accuracy of assumptions as to their desires and beliefs, but these explanations are trivial, e.g. in the case of a hotel fire, most people escape because they want to stay alive.[xii] In the case of the fire right before our eyes, the facts speak for themselves in the sense that no narrative analysis is required to explain the motivation of people escaping fire. However, in the complex international reality, the way from the fact to the audience’s level of consciousness is complicated, and the fact itself may be twisted along the way or may even disappear completely. This does not change Wendt’s assumption that objective constraints resulting from the international environment must also be taken into account. The explanatory power of constructivism has weaknesses, which are a starting point for the search for more refined theoretical tools.[xiii] In a complex international environment, reference to different theoretical approaches becomes warranted and is reflected in numerous scientific studies. The development of different intra-EU forms of regional cooperation in Central Europe calls for a multi-dimensional analysis, with various theoretical approaches proving useful in finding answers to the related research questions.

The theory of liberalism, advocated by small states, is proving particularly useful when studying cooperative behaviours. In this sense, it is not war, but peace that is the natural state of international relations, and states can benefit more by cooperating than by competing. The emphasis on international law, in the light of which all states are equal, diminishes the importance of power as a primary indicator of the position of actors in international relations.[xiv] In the theory of liberalism, the position of small states becomes stronger than the balance of power would suggest, and their combined voice, forged in cooperation, can enhance this strength. Cooperation can help reduce the quest for dominance by certain states and pave way for new avenues of influence in the international environment. Institutions are not tools of dominance of states, and cooperation does not only contribute to achieve their interests, but creates a new quality, a new added value serving common interests. Exploration of the underlying motives for cooperation within the Three Seas Initiative led me to conclusion that its participants express reasonable behaviour in an anarchic environment. They try to pursue their own interests while taking into account the common interest. By acting within the initiative, they affect the behaviour of other actors in international relations. A high degree of participation in various forms of multilateral cooperation constitutes one of the characteristic features of small states’ policies.[xv] The realism theory presents another explanation of the motives for cooperation.[xvi] In general, realists take a pessimistic approach to international cooperation, believing that states’ decision to cooperate is motivated by their own self-centred interests. In the minimum variant they seek to improve their own security, and in the maximum variant they seek to establish dominance. This spectrum is decisive when choosing a particular option and when assessing other states’ behaviour, with small states not involved in the battle for dominance. Realists concentrate their attention on the superpowers, perceiving small states as the object of international politics rather than its subject.[xvii] The research findings indicating that small states are able to effectively exert influence on decisions taken by international institutions, whose actions often correspond to the preferences of small states, contradict such a position. The exact mechanism behind this remains unclear to scientists.[xviii] On the ground of realism, international cooperation is motivated by the struggle for interests and power of particular states and also by rivalry. The underlying dilemma associated with the decision of state authorities to commit to work together concerns the question of to what extent it serves their own national interests and how it may affect the distribution of power. A common threat constitutes one of the main motivations for states to cooperate. In the international context, it is worth noting that the Three Seas Initiative was launched during the time of growing threat from Russia. The illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014, followed by the violent Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, presented a real threat to the vital interests of many countries, especially small Eastern European states.

The Three Seas Initiative as an opportunity and for small states

Small states employ many different strategies to minimise or compensate for the relative weakness: ranging from defensive policies of isolation through strategies of adaptation to strategies of international activism.[xix] The functioning of the international system on the basis of the principles and norms of international law, including the principle of sovereign equality and the principle of refraining from the use of armed force, remains fundamental to them. Participation in various forms of multilateral cooperation allows them to promote those principles and constitutes the basis of a broadly understood international engagement strategy. This allows small states to exert influence, greater than their potential would suggest, in shaping the international environment, to gain greater access to data and to the decision-making capacity of key players. However, involvement in regional formats requires diplomatic and organizational efforts, which can prove challenging for small states, especially with abundance of already existing forms of cooperation. Hence the need for the optimal and cautious investment of resources available to the small states, so that the benefits and risks involved are all taken into account. The decision of small states to join the Three Seas Initiative was based on their opinion that the expected benefits would outweigh the risks.

A key motive for small states to get involved in the Three Seas Initiative was their pragmatic desire to achieve tangible benefits by boosting the region’s economy. The opening words of the Dubrovnik Statement (2016) mentioned the importance of “connecting the economies and infrastructures of Central and Eastern Europe from North to South, to complete the construction of the European Common Market, bearing in mind that most efforts to date have been to connect the East and West of Europe”.[xx] Through the individual efforts of countries, it would be practically impossible to build infrastructure links between the northern and southern parts of Central Europe. The needs of the region are vast, as the so-called list of priority interconnection projects, unveiled during the Bucharest Summit in 2018, covering some 150 pages, demonstrated to a certain extent. This list has since been significantly expanded. It was intended to garner political support for the listed projects and to encourage concerned governments, companies and financial institutions to work together for their prompt implementation. In 2022 the list included 91 submitted projects. Seventeen projects have been submitted by Hungary and Croatia, twelve by Poland, eleven by Lithuania and Latvia, eight by Slovakia, seven by Romania and Slovenia, six by Estonia, four by Bulgaria and one by Czechia.[xxi] The appeal of the Three Seas Initiative is largely based on the fact that this cooperation is expected to eliminate the enduring division of the European Union into Western Europe and the underdeveloped Eastern Europe. This is in line with the interests of the Three Seas Initiative small states. The expected benefits primarily include boosting economic growth through the development of energy and transport infrastructure, and also the North-South digitalisation. Small states feature a tight internal market, high dependence on external markets and on the current global economic prosperity. The development of cooperation, on which the concept of the Three Seas Initiative is based, addresses the needs of these states. The selected model of cooperation further provides opportunities to establish fresh networks and influence the international environment in new ways. Besides the economic and political aspect, cooperation within the Three Seas Initiative indirectly concerns the area of security in various aspects. In terms of energy security, crucial efforts include seeking to diversify delivery routes and sources of supply of raw materials for the region. which has been dependant on Russian raw material supplies for many years. In the wider sense of security, Poland’s strong commitment to promoting this regional cooperation, with support of the United States, is of significant importance. The United States remains the strongest military power worldwide and guarantees European security. All the Three Seas Initiative states, save for Austria, belong to NATO and this form of cooperation provides an additional opportunity to solidify relations within the alliance. Speaking of opportunities created by the Three Seas Initiative, Egils Levits, the President of Latvia, which hosted the 2022 Summit in Riga, highlighted cross-border infrastructure projects concerning digital, energy and transport connections. He stated that the cross-border infrastructure demands of the twelve countries are still substantial, despite EU funding. However, he also identified another dimension of the Three Seas Initiative, important especially in the light of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[xxii]

The Three Seas Initiative provides numerous examples demonstrating how small states can benefit from this opportunity for cooperation. Let us begin by noting that the Dubrovnik Presidential Summit of 2016, organised by Croatia in cooperation with Poland, is considered to be the date when this format was created. Croatia is presented as one of the initiators of this cooperation, which has strengthened its recognition and prestige on the international stage. Furthermore, it co-hosted the Three Seas Initiative Summit in Warsaw, which was personally attended by the president of the United States. It was the most important diplomatic event in Central Europe in 2017.[xxiii] The Three Seas Initiative is based on a loose-knit model of cooperation, which in many ways is considered optimal by small states. Firstly, it somewhat imitates an organisation and offers some of the benefits associated with it without fixed costs; secondly, due to its flexibility, it is not a source of rigid obligations that might compel states to behave in a certain way. A. Kosowska believes that “Most small states conduct their foreign affairs in a similar way: usually through cheap and effective methods, which include multilateral diplomacy rather than bilateral diplomacy”.[xxiv] In the case of the Three Seas Initiative, small states have a clear preference for the so-called project-oriented model of cooperation, bolstered by the summit diplomacy in the format of presidential meetings. States are driven by the desire to maximise benefits while optimizing the management costs of a specific task. Establishing permanent institutions within the Three Seas Initiative is a regularly recurring topic in discussions, but the rising levels of bureaucracy would necessitate the development of control functions, which would translate into an increase in the cost of controlling the international environment through the partnership. The choice of loose-knit forms of regional cooperation that dominates in Central Europe translates into relatively high effectiveness in exerting influence on the other actors’ behaviour combined with great flexibility and low operating costs. Moreover, it helps to avoid empowering one state, where the organisation’s permanent headquarters would be located, at the cost of weakening other states’ positions.

As already mentioned, taking into account the institutional aspects, the functioning of the Three Seas Initiative is based on the annual presidential summits. Hosting the summit is not a legal obligation, countries may or may not take this opportunity. Among the countries that have so far hosted the summit are Croatia (2016), Poland (2017), Romania (2019 and 2023), Slovenia (2019), Estonia (2020), Bulgaria (2021) and Latvia (2022). Estonia stands out among them and, as the smallest country in terms of population in the Three Seas Initiative (population of 1.3 million, area of 45 300 km2), deserves attention. The Tallinn 2020 Summit was promoted by the Estonian government as a major diplomatic event. The official website mentioned that “The fifth Three Seas Summit and its third business forum will be held at the Tallinn Creative Hub on 19 & 20 October 2020. […]. It will be one of the biggest and most influential events in Estonia’s recent history, with the potential to make a significant contribution to the development of Central and Eastern European states and to the well-being of more than one hundred million people.”[xxv] The Estonian Ambassador Martin Roger explained that “We have hosted various events in Estonia over the last decade, the held the Presidency of the Council of the European Union from July 2017 until the end of December 2017 or the informal NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting in April 2010. The Three Seas Initiative Summit in its physical form would indeed be a very important meeting, bringing together 12 participating countries, partners, the vast business community. A change of format does not alter its content and objectives. We will therefore organise a Virtual Summit.”[xxvi] Pandemic proved to present an unexpected challenge to the hosts. The original date of the Three Seas Initiative Tallinn Summit was scheduled for June, then postponed to October, until the decision was made to change the format to the Three Seas Virtual Summit and Web Forum, organised in this format for the very first time. While on the one hand this impeded the original plan, as many official delegations had to be cancelled, on the other hand it presented an additional opportunity that Estonia managed to take advantage of. It has reinforced its reputation of a smart state. As the host of the summit, Estonia unveiled its concept of development in the area of smart connectivity, strengthening its reputation of a country boasting a high level of innovation and digitalisation. As the host of the summit, Estonia has also created a new website for the Three Seas Initiative, registered its new logo, and created the ‘Research Papers’ website, where it effectively promotes selected research papers on the Three Seas Initiative.[xxvii] It should be noted that two months following the Tallinn Summit held in December 2020, the completion of the second (after Cargounit) investment ever made by the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund (FIIT), which acquired 92% of shares in the Estonian-based company Greenergy Data Centers, was announced.[xxviii] Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund remains a separate issue. It is an independent legal entity, a commercial fund, although its origin is closely linked to the Three Seas Initiative. From the small states’ perspective, it felt important to have Poland take the main investment risk. BGK (Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego) is still the largest shareholder of the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund, having increased its contribution from EUR 500 million to EUR 750 million in 2020. The remaining nine states declared contributions of EUR 20 million, apart from Slovenia with a contribution of EUR 22 million.[xxix] The fund has drawn the attention of investors to Central Europe; joint promotional efforts have resulted in the United States declaring its commitment. Should the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund succeed, the entire region will benefit measurably, however, in the event of the investment failure, the risk for small states remains low. The attention should be drawn here to the ability of small states to take advantage of the opportunities provided by the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund. The Czechs, just like the Slovaks, signed a letter of intent to establish the fund, indicating their willingness to join the fund, but made no formal commitment. Czechia, Slovakia and Austria are not among the so-called core sponsors, as many paper suggest. Very few authors report that the Czechs have taken the opportunity to nominate their representative to the Board of the Fund.[xxx] There has been some interest in the fund from the Slovakian side, but no binding actions so far. The Austrian authorities have repeatedly declared their lack of interest in such an investment institution. This did not prevent Austrian-based company Enery, operating in several countries in Central Europe, including Czechia and Slovakia, from being chosen as the fund’s third investment. As a result, despite the moderate attitude towards the fund, these states managed to draw concrete benefits from it and receive particularistic advantages in the short term.  It was crucial on the part of small states to overcome German and E.U. scepticism and gain support from the United States. Under the Bucharest Declaration of 2018 adopted by the presidents of the Three Seas Initiative states, the United States and Germany were awarded the status of partner states, and the European Commission, the European Investment Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank Group were awarded the status of partner institutions.[xxxi] In contrast, in the declaration adopted in Riga in 2022, the United States, Germany and the European Commission were described as strategic partners of the Three Seas Initiative. Ukraine has been granted the status of a partner state.[xxxii] The support of Japan and the United Kingdom was also mentioned. The basic pillars and objectives of the Three Seas Initiative were defined as: strengthening economic development; strengthening European cohesion, also by modernising infrastructure in the region; strengthening transatlantic ties. This direction of cooperation development presents new opportunities and possibilities in line with the interests of small states and, concurrently, in the common interests of Central European states, the European Union, and the transatlantic community.

Challenges and threats

The Three Seas Initiative was originally a concept of the Central European states with Poland and Croatia playing a key role. However, the tensions between Poland and the EU institutions and Germany, the overlapping problem concerning German-American relations, remained a burden from the small states’ perspective. Any actions that could be construed as an effort to undermine their relations with Brussels and Berlin raised concern. An integral element of the politics of small states is the awareness that their survival is highly dependent on their relations with other actors in international relations, especially at a time of growing military threats. In the area of deficits that small states of the Three Seas Initiative constantly face, military insecurity is the most measurable and relevant from the viewpoint of their vital interests. The EU and NATO (with the exception of a non-NATO Austria) are their pillars of security, with a strong German position in Europe and the United States worldwide.[xxxiii]

In many ways, Poland remains an attractive partner for small Central European states, but they are not ready to tighten relations with Warsaw at the risk of deteriorating relations with Germany or Brussels. Poland lacks financial resources necessary to implement ambitious projects within the Three Seas Initiative and its ability to seek support at the EU level is limited. However, external support is required given that the Three Seas states cover almost a third of the EU’s territory, a quarter of the EU’s population, but contribute much less to the EU’s GDP. In terms of GDP per capita, salaries, quality of life, infrastructure, Austria stands as a clear leader among the Three Seas states. However, in the face of Russian aggression, the balance of power is shifting and so are the political priorities of small states. From their perspective, among the challenges associated with participation in the Three Seas Initiative, the biggest concerns related to the possible negative impact of this new form of cooperation on the participating states’ relations with Germany and the European Commission.

The small states do not wish to be a party to the contentious issues separating Poland from the group of larger European actors, led by Germany. Despite the signal of a change of attitude from Brussels and Berlin in 2018, as demonstrated by awarding the partner status to Germany and partner Institution status to the European Commission, the position of the European Commission and the European Union has remained ambiguous. Some concerns had been dispelled, but some are still relevant. In 2019, Ambassador of Slovakia to Poland Dusan Kristofik said: “Slovakia objected to the creation of a new political or geographical concept on the European map that could draw new demarcation lines between ‘Eastern and Western Europe’, which would be counterproductive. The initiative should not be an alternative to the EU”.[xxxiv] Another category of threats, built at the narrative level by those against this cooperation, related to the superpower ambitions attributed to Poland and its quest for regional dominance. This element is particularly emphasised in the Russian narrative[xxxv]. Against the background of the region’s small states, Poland indeed stands out, but compared to its large neighbouring states of Germany and Russia, it has much less potential and lacks the means and ambitions to be a regional hegemon. Poland, due to its size and geographical location, appears to be a sizeable country compared to other countries in the region, but compared to other European countries

– is an average-sized country at best. According to J. Juozaitis, “Poland, while being neither a small state nor a superpower, emerged as a potential builder of the coalition of small states sharing a transatlantic attitude towards EU strategic autonomy”.[xxxvi] Among the concerns raised against the Three Seas Initiative by small states, the adopted form of cooperation is believed to be unclear. The flexible model implied a lack of legal agreements that could provide a conclusive answer to many questions. Transferring the organisation of summits each year presented additional challenges in the field of coordination between participants, given the absence of any permanent institution. Another category of challenges involved the potential impact of this cooperation on the regional balance of power as a consequence of unequal distribution of benefits among the participants. The selection of investment projects promoted by the Three Seas Initiative involved a decision on direction of developments and benefits which, for some countries, may strengthen their position, but for others, relatively weaken it. From the realistic point of view, the decision makers do not reflect on whether a state will benefit from a given cooperation, but try to determine whether they will benefit more from it than other states. This is reflected, e.g. in discussions on the establishment of permanent Three Seas institutions, at least in a limited capacity, such as a secretariat. Ultimately, no institution was established at the Three Seas Initiative level, however, a similar discussion occurred on the occasion of the establishment of the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund, which is, I stress, a separate commercial entity. When choosing its headquarters, arguments were raised that it should be located in one of the Three Seas states to enhance its prestige and contribute to its development. Lower operating costs of such establishment and the aim to strengthen the local business community also spoke in favour of this solution. However, another solution prevailed

– the choice of Luxembourg for the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund headquarters allowed to avoid the Three Seas states competing for this privilege. Discrepancies in how threats are defined are a constant factor adversely affecting cooperation in Central Europe. In the face of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, all the EU countries, including the small Three Seas Initiative states together with NATO, have demonstrated solidarity and ability to work together, but significant differences have appeared. Between the eastern, small European states, at one end of the spectrum there are Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, in favour of severe measures against Russia,[xxxvii] and at the opposite end, Hungary, having great sympathy for Russia’s actions and obstructing efforts to support Ukraine.[xxxviii] Russia has many instruments to keep impacting the states of Central Europe and play them out. Besides the hard power factors, it is worth to mention the ability to build influence among the elites. Studying at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations still looks appealing and attracts youth in some Central European countries to Russia. For example, the Slovaks still regard Russia as one of their primary destinations for educational travel.[xxxix]

Another category of challenges the Three Seas Initiative is facing concerns the adequacy of the level of aspirations in relation to real capabilities. Concerns arise among small states as to whether the implementation of bold, ambitious projects is possible, or is boosting the economic growth of the eastern part of the EU realistic, given the existing financial and structural constraints. Small states with limited resources must manage them in the best possible way; participation in structures that exist but do not produce tangible results appears to be an unnecessary burden for diplomacy and the government budget. In unofficial talks, the Central European Initiative is regarded as such an example.[xl]

In conclusion, challenges associated with the Three Seas Initiative on the particular levels of analysis can be identified as follows:

• at the state level: at this level, the key issue is how much can each country benefit from this cooperation, with the emphasis on relative rather than absolute gain. I would like to highlight the importance of the available information and knowledge of these benefits at the level of public awareness and the message built.
• Central European and EU level: this is the main area of activity of the small states’ foreign policy. These countries expect the Three Seas Initiative to be closely integrated with the European Union. The biggest threat is the perception of the Three Seas Initiative as an alleged attempt to seek to develop an alternative to the EU. At this level of analysis, an important factor is the asymmetry in relations between small states and medium/large states like Poland and Romania with the activity of regional and global superpowers in this part of Europe.
• global level: it essentially remains outside the area of small states’ activity. However, it is important to mention that support for the Three Seas Initiative is provided by the United States, which, from the small states’ perspective, bolsters their security and constitutes a constraining factor for the Russian agenda. The US support for regional cooperation in Central Europe is negatively received in pro-Russian circles.

Summary

The main opportunities offered to small states by the Three Seas Initiative include the possibility of influencing its activities to correspond with their preferences. The priority areas include energy infrastructure, transport infrastructure and digitalisation. The Three Seas cooperation indirectly creates the possibility to increase their influence in the field of politics and security, especially as regards energy security. Furthermore, it is becoming a platform for the development of contacts with third parties, including the United States, Germany, Ukraine and the European Commission. The development of cooperation within the Three Seas Initiative to date reveals that small states are capable of effectively affect the course of decisions taken on this forum, in line with their interests. The Three Seas Initiative was created in 2016 as a new, initially undefined format of cooperation, comprising ten small states together with Poland and Romania. In the years 2016–2023, presidential summits were hosted every year in a different country; as a matter of fact, most of them were hosted by small states. Besides the political dimension, expanded from the presidential level to the governmental level and, to some extent, local government, attempts were made to cooperate in other areas, such as the Business Forum, the Civil Society Forum, the Local Government Three Seas Congress and the Economic Forum. The CEEplus index, established by the stock exchanges of the seven Three Seas states and coordinated by the Warsaw Stock Exchange, was inspired by the Three Seas Initiative.[xli] A separate commercial entity, the Three Seas Initiative Investment Fund, has also been established. It is worth noting that the Three Seas Initiative has become an important platform for promotional activities to attract new investors to Central Europe. Reports, analytical and scientific papers about the economic potential of the region and the benefits that this cooperation can bring, have been produced. The socalled list of priority interconnection projects helped to publicise specific infrastructural needs reported by individual countries. At the narrative level, an important new point of reference has emerged. Overall, the Three Seas Initiative has given small states new ways to express their needs, build contacts and implement their interests. As previously mentioned, small states share common challenges of coping with the relative deficit of power in international relations. With limited resources at hand, they seek optimal ways to ensure that their interests are taken care of, with participation in regional cooperation and strong international activity on at the regional level among the features of their foreign policy. In terms of threats, small states are voicing concerns that the Three Seas Initiative might take action not in line with their foreign policy priorities. They also point out the asymmetry of potentials and a significant role of Poland. The importance of accuracy of expression, a communication strategy that would work towards building trust and good neighbourly relations, is getting increasingly important under these conditions. Small states acting as rational actors in an anarchic environment, in pursuit of their business, must pay close attention to their fundamental interest of security and survival. In the evolving international environment, with the rising threat from Russia, the role of the Three Seas Initiative and the opportunities for small states to bolster their position through it is increasing.

[i] The issue of defining small states is widely covered in: G. Baldacchino, A. Wivel (ed.), Handbook on the Politics of Small States, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2020, pp. 2–25, also in: P. Bajda, Małe państwo europejskie na arenie międzynarodowej. Polityka zagraniczna Republiki Słowackiej w latach 1993–2016, Centre of Political Thought, UKSW Publishing House, Kraków-Warsaw 2018, pp. 23–82.

[ii] The six countries are: Croatia, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia and Slovenia.

[iii] Czechia, Bulgaria, Austria, and Hungary. The point of reference for 10 million population and 80,000 km2 is the criterion of 50% of the pre-Brexit EU average. See. P. Bajda. op. cit., p. 57.

[iv] I define the term ‘opportunities’ as chances created by the Three Seas Initiative for the participating states. Such states can take advantage of the opportunities to achieve the desired results.

[v] On the role of the leader in the Three Seas Initiative see. A. Orzelska-Stączek, P. Ukielski P., Inicjatywa Trójmorza z perspektywy jej uczestników, ISP PAN, Warsaw 2020, pp. 80–85. Minister K. Szczerski, when asked what country plays such a role, responded: “I see a group of leaders – namely the countries that organised the summits.”, Interview with the Head of the Cabinet of the President of Poland, minister K. Szczerski, conducted at the Chancellery of the President of Poland in Warsaw on 17 July 2019 by A. Orzelska-Stączek and M. Czernicka. Ibidem, p. 149.

[vi] P. Bajda, op. cit., p. 18.

[vii] Joint Declaration of the Seventh Summit Three Seas Initiative (Riga, 20–21 June 2022), https://3si.politic.edu.pl/three-seas-initiative/joint-statements-ofthe-three-seas-initiative/ [access: 10.02.2023].

[viii] P. Bajda, op. cit.

[ix] Handbook on the Politics of Small States…, op. cit.,

[x] G. Česnakas, J. Juozaitis (red.), European Strategic Autonomy and Small States’ Security: In the Shadow of Power, 2022, Routledge, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003324867 [access: 10.02.2023]

[xi] A. Wendt, Społeczna teoria stosunków międzynarodowych, Warsaw 2008.

[xii] A. Wendt, op. cit., p. 118.

[xiii] According to A. Visvizi “Constructivism is incapable of giving a clear and unambiguous explanation of the nature of interactions that develop between structures (both material and conceptual) and subjective causality. As outlined before, this leads either to a methodological individualism with a tendency to excessive subjectivisation of the argument or to a methodological collectivism in which the role of subjective causality is put in brackets.” – says A. Visvizi, Realizm krytyczny i morfogeneza wobec metateoretycznych pułapek konstruktywizmu: od teorii do praktyki w studiach europejskich, in: J. Ruszkowski, L. Wojnicz (red.), Teorie w studiach europejskich: w kierunku nowej agendy badawczej, Szczecin: The Institute of Political Science and European Studies at the University of Szczecin; Warsaw: The Institute of European Studies at the University of Warsaw, 2012, p. 9. An interesting suggestion for a theoretical approach was presented by A. Dudek, Użyteczność analitycznego eklektyzmu w badaniu stosunków Polski z Rosją, “International Relations” 2016;52(2), 39–70

[xiv] P. Bajda, op. cit., pp. 78–81.

[xv] A. Kosowska, Duża Unia małych krajów – państwa małe w Unii Europejskiej, in: R. Żelichowski (ed.), Małe państwa Europy Zachodniej i terytoria o statusie specjalnym, ISP PAN, Warsaw 2008, pp. 25–27.

[xvi] A. Orzelska-Stączek, Inicjatywa Trójmorza w świetle teorii realizmu. Polityczne aspekty nowej formy współpracy dwunastu państw, “International Affairs”, M. Waleczek, Współpraca w świetle nurtów realizmu defensywnego i realizmu ofensywnego. Przypadek współpracy turecko-irańskiej, [in:] Teoria realizmu w nauce o stosunkach międzynarodowych, ed. J. Czaputowicz, E. Haliżak, PTSM, Rambler, Warsaw 2014, http://ptsm.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/publikacje/teoria-realizmuw-nauce-o-stosunkach- [access: 10.02.2023].

[xvii] J. Juozaitis, Introduction. Small States, International Institutions, and European Strategic Autonomy, in: G. Česnakas, J. Juozaitis (ed.), op. cit., p. 21.

[xviii] J. Juozaitis, Introduction. Small States, op. cit., p. 22.

[xix] A. Kosowska, op. cit. p. 26.

[xx] Joint Declaration on the Three Seas Initiative (Dubrovnik Summit Declaration of 25 August 2016), https://trojmorze.isppan.waw.pl/inicjatywa-trojmorza/deklaracje-szczytow-inicjatywy-trojmorza/wspolna-deklaracja-w-sprawie-inicjatywy-trojmorza-deklaracja-z-dubrownika-25-sierpnia-2016/ [access: 10.02.2023]. More on the economic potential: K. Popławski, J. Jakóbowski, Building closer connections. The Three Seas region as an economic area, Polish Economic Institute, Warsaw 2020, https://pie.net.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/PIE-Three-Seas.pdf [access: 10.02.2023].

[xxi] Details: https://projects.3seas.eu/report [access: 10.02.2023].

[xxii] Address by the President of the Republic of Latvia Egils Levits, A. Sprūds, M. Vargulis (ed), Three Seas Initiative: Mapping National Perspectives, Latvian Institute of International Affairs, 2022, p. 7, https://liia.lv/en/publications/three-seasinitiative-mapping-national-perspectives-1002?get_file=1 [access: 10.02.2023].

[xxiii] More information about the summit in: P. Kowal, A. Orzelska-Stączek, Inicjatywa Trójmorza. Geneza, cele i funkcjonowanie ISP PAN, Warsaw 2019, pp. 56–60.

[xxiv] A. Kosowska, op, cit., p. 27.

[xxv] “The fifth Three Seas Summit and its third business forum will be held at the Tallinn Creative Hub on 19 & 20 October 2020. The event will bring heads of state, leading business figures, and senior officials from Europe and the United States to Estonia. It will be one of the biggest and most influential events in Estonia’s recent history, with the potential to make a significant contribution to the development of Central and Eastern European countries and to the well-being of more than one hundred million people.’ 2020 Summit and Business Forum, Tallinn, Estonia,https://www.3seas.eu/event/summit-and-business-forum-estonia?lang=en [access: 10.02.2023].

[xxvi] Ambassador M. Roger in the interview with A. Legucka and A. Orzelska-Stączek, M. Estonia’s vision of the Three Seas Initiative. International Affairs, 2020, 73(2), 11–21. https://doi.org/10.35757/SM.2020.73.2.13 [access: 10.02.2023].

[xxvii] https://3seas.eu/about/three-seas-trademark?lang=pl [access: 10.02.2023].

[xxviii] The exact amount of the transaction is not known, but the Investment Committee has authorised funds of up to EUR 70.9 million for the investment. Greenergy is implementing the development of the largest and most energy-efficient data centre in the Baltic region. The project is also notable for its 100% renewable energy use.

Digital data storage and processing solutions will be available to all countries in the region. The company’s plans also include data centres outside Estonia. J. Wilczek, A. Rudowski, Fundusz Trójmorza W stronę instytucjonalizacji Inicjatywy?, Collegium Interethnicum Publishing House, Warsaw 2021, https://interethnicum.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/BAROMETER_3_final.pdf [access: 10.02.2023].

[xxix] In May 2022, the total declared budget of the Investment Fund amounted to EUR 928 million. The budget included the contributions of key investors from the nine Three Seas states, who declared a total contribution amounting to EUR 913 million, and two private investors. The fund’s target budget is expected to amount to EUR 3–5 billion.

[xxx] https://3siif.eu/fund-structure [access: 10.02.2023].

[xxxi] Joint Declaration of the Third Summit of the Three Seas Initiative (Bucharest, 17–18 September 2018) https://trojmorze.isppan.waw.pl/inicjatywa-trojmorza/ deklaracje-szczytow-inicjatywy-trojmorza/wspolna-deklaracja-iii-szczytu-inicjatywy- trojmorza-bukareszt-17–18-wrzesnia-2018/ [access: 10.02.2023].

[xxxii] Joint Declaration of the Seventh Summit Three Seas Initiative (Riga, 20–21 June 2022), “We welcome Ukraine as a special guest in this year’s 3SI Summit and as a partner to the 3SI who from today begins the process of participating in the 3SI”. https://3si.politic.edu.pl/joint-declaration-of-the-seventh-summit-three-seasinitiative-riga-20–21-june-2022/ [access: 10.02.2023].

[xxxiii] J. Juozaitis “small European states generally perceive the partnership with the United States and memberships in NATO and the EU as their primary security providers.” – J. Juozaitis, op. cit.

[xxxiv] Interview with H.E. Ambassador Dušan Krištofík conducted at the Slovak Embassy in Warsaw 6 June 2019 by Prof. Agnieszka Orzelska-Stączek and Marzena Czernicka, PhD in: A. Orzelska-Stączek, P. Ukielski, Inicjatywa Trójmorza z perspektywy jej uczestników, ISP PAN, Warsaw, 2020, p. 168.

[xxxv] P. Bielicki, Stanowisko Rosji wobec Inicjatywy Trójmorza, „Studia z Dziejów Rosji i Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej”, 2022, T. 57, no. 1, DOI 10.12775/SDR.2022.1.08. https://apcz.umk.pl/SDR/article/view/40412/33404 [access: 10.02.2023].

[xxxvi] J. Juozaitis, op. cit.

[xxxvii] https://ies.lublin.pl/komentarze/panstwa-baltyckie-kolejne-ograniczenia-irosyjski-odwet/ [access: 10.02.2023].

[xxxviii] https://www.pism.pl/publikacje/wegry-wobec-zagrozenia-ponowna-agresjarosji-na-ukraine [access: 10.02.2023].

[xxxix] This aspect was highlighted by P. Bajda in the abovementioned research paper published in 2018. This trend remains the same: https://www.saia.sk/sk/main-old/schvaleni-stipendisti/vyberove-konania-na-skolsky-rok-2020/2021/ruska-federaciamgimo [access: 10.02.2023]. Information based on data from the Slovak Academic Information Agency.

[xl] Insights of the study visit to Prague as part of the project entitled Research Centre for the Three Seas Initiative, ISP PAN, December 2022.

[xli] „Poland’s share in this index has been intentionally capped at 50%, otherwise Polish companies would dominate it”, https://ine.org.pl/5-wyzwan-stojacych-przedtrojmorzem/ [access: 10.02.2023].